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ABSTRACT
With the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of
1994, the U.S. Federal Government set in motion a process which is intended to
reform the federal acquisition process with the aim of achieving greater efficiency
and value. Although numerous initiatives have been adopted in pursuit of this
goal, one area which has been neglected is performance bonds. In keeping with
the Total Quality Management (TQM) objective of reaping benefits from the "low
hanging fruit" first, this paper examines the potential savings available as a result
of relatively minor changes to the way requirements for performance bonds on
Navy construction contracts are determined.
The result is savings which appear to be "hanging low" indeed. By shifting
to a risk-based system of requiring performance bonds only on those contract
with an appreciable default risk, savings of 0.5% to 1.0% of the gross cost of
construction appear to be available with very little loss potential.

PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE BONDS
introduction
The procurement system used in obtaining construction and construction
related services by agencies within the United States Federal Government is
intended to obtain maximum value for the dollars spent while simultaneously
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. However, as may be expected in
any organization with many thousands of people involved in the acquisition
process, the individual interpretations of these goals can be as diverse as the
individuals engaged in the process. Consequently, the Federal Government has
evolved an immensely complex set of laws, regulations, and agency policies
intended to guide procurement officials in the acquisition process.
Within the Department of the Navy, the major applicable "guidelines"
include the Armed Services Procurement Act, Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR), DoD FAR Supplement (DFAR), Navy Acquisition Supplement (NAPS),
Naval Facilities Engineering Command Contracting Manual (P-68), and a myriad
of others too numerous to list.
The result of this proliferation of regulations is a system in which the
development of U.S. Navy construction contracts is frequently accomplished with
a blind reliance on the "boiler-plate" provisions contained in the regulations.
Acquisition professionals are routinely forced to abandon their business and/or
engineering judgment in favor of absolute regulatory compliance. Worse yet is
the fact that career officials, after years of being forced to second their judgment

to the "letter of the law," may loose the desire, or even the ability, to exercise
sound judgment and eventually come to rely solely on the blind application of
regulations. At this point, the development of contract requirements becomes a
mechanical exercise in matching boiler plate sections of a standard construction
specification database to the types of work occurring within the project and
adding a standard general administrative requirements section. All of this is
accomplished with little or no consideration to the true scope of the project. For
example, a contract involving cast-in-place concrete will include the 03300
section of the standard specifications, and all of the included testing
requirements, without regard to whether the project includes 30 cubic yards or
30,000 cubic yards of concrete.
This blind reliance on regulations in the development of contracts results in
contract documents which do not accurately address the requirements of the
project. In addition to the technical problems as described above, similar
problems frequently occur in establishing the administrative provisions such as
including a requirement for a 2500 activity Critical Path Method (CPM) project
schedule in the contract for a small construction or renovation project. This
method of contract development may help to ensure that necessary provisions
are not inadvertently omitted from the contract, however it also ensures that
unnecessary or excessive requirements will likely be included.
On the surface it might not seem that including unnecessary or excessive
requirements in a contract constitutes a significant problem. After all, one of the
system objectives is to ensure that it procures high quality goods and services

and more stringent requirements ultimately lead to better quality, right? Perhaps.
However, recall that the true objective of the procurement system is obtaining
"value" for the dollars spent. Examined from the perspective of value, excessive
requirements are clearly a problem. When a prospective contractor reviews
project documents to prepare a bid. he must assume that he will be expected to
comply with all of the provisions contained therein. Thus the bid he submits to
the Government will include some allowance for items that the Government may
not really require. In the case of the CPM schedule, described above, the
schedule alone may require several thousand dollars of administrative effort on
the part of the contractor, all of which is passed on to the Government in the
contractor's bid. Since this allowance will appear in all bids, the overall price level
of the project is escalated.
With this background, it is readily apparent that there is a massive problem
which will not be corrected quickly or easily and it is unlikely that a single action
could implement the changes necessary to affect the reintroduction of judgment
and reason to the federal contracting process. The problem has been recognized
at the highest levels of the federal government and with the passage of the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, the process of repainng the
system has begun 1 The intent of this paper is to focus on a single, simple
' General Accounting Office Report No. GAG7NSIAD-96-139 (Letter Report 06/28/96)
Acquisition Reform: Regulatory Implementation of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of
1994
.
GAO found that: (1) except in two instances, all proposed revisions to the federal
acquisition regulations (FAR) needed to implement FASA were published by the May 11, 1995
FASA deadline: (2) the proposed regulation on fraud remedies was published 1 day late and the
implementing regulation on alternatives to payment bonds had not been published as of March
1996; (3) 13 of the 29 FAR needed to implement FASA were published in final form by the
September 8, 1995 deadline and two regulations were issued in interim form; (4) 11 additional
final FAR were published by October 1 . 1995; (5) in addition to the regulation on payment bond

element of the standard construction contract requirements which has not already
been addressed in the FASA process and to propose a formalized process
through which contracting officials can assess the legitimate requirements of a
given project and reach rational conclusions with respect to the best method of
codifying the requirements in the contract documents.
The specific element which will be the focus of this paper is the
administrative requirement for submission of performance bonds by contractors
performing Navy construction contracts. Currently this requirement is absolute.
Submission of performance bonds is required by law2 for all construction
contracts exceeding $25,000.00. This requirement remains despite the FASA
objective of shifting from "cookbook management" to "disciplined innovation."
Thus every contractor is required to provide a performance bond to protect the
Government from potential default by the contractor. The cost of this bond is
typically in the range of 0.5% to 1 .0% of the bonded value of the contract3 and is
passed on to the Government in the contractor s bid price.
alternatives, regulations on multi-year contracting and small disadvantaged businesses had not
been published by October 1 , 1995; (6) the factors that slowed the revision process included
translating FASA language and addressing public comments, particularly those on the more
complex, innovative, and controversial revisions: (7) there was less compliance with FASA
deadlines regarding non-FAR regulations; (8) FAR drafting teams had considerable experience
in drafting regulations and used numerous public comments to improve the revisions; (9) certain
agencies provided training resources and explanatory materials to help buying activities
understand FASA changes and make FAR revisions concise and understandable Full text of all
GAO report cited can be accessed by searching on the report number at:
http://www access.gpo.gov/su_docs
2 40 USC 270a, The Miiler Act. Excerpt of the applicable section of the Miller Act is included as
Appendix A. Full text is available at http://www law vill.edu/Fed-Agency/fedwebloc.html
J
Robert L. Peunfoy and Garoid D Oberlender, Estimating Construction Costs , pg. 16 (4th ed.
1989), Representative percentage costs were computed from a graduated cost scale ranging
from $14.40 per $1000 of bonded value for contracts under $500,000 to $6.30 per $1000 of
bonded value for contracts under $7,500,000.

On the surface it may seem appropriate to have performance bonds
provided for all projects, however when examined more closely from the
perspective of seeking maximum value for construction dollars spent, some
cracks appear. The intent of the performance bond is to protect the Government
from the costs associated with a contractor defaulting in the performance of a
contract
4
. The bond represents a commitment from a surety, or bonding
company, to ensure the completion of the project in the event that such a default
occurs. However, events which lead to termination of a contract are relatively
rare
5
. Additionally, the bonding companies do not earn profits by readily paying
every claim against the bonds they issue. Thus, in the case that the Navy does
seek relief of expenses resulting from a contractor's default, the bonding
company is likely to engage in legal maneuvers designed to mitigate or eliminate
its financial liability
6
. In cases like this the Navy incurs additional legai expenses
4
Justin Sweet Legal Aspects of Architecture Engineering, and the Construction Process
,
§33.06
pg. 734 (5th ed. 1994)
5 General Accounting Office Report No.: GAO/NSIAD-96-106 (Letter Report. 04/18/96),
Acquisition Reform: Efforts to Reduce the Cost to Manage and Oversee POD . GAO found that:
an independent study identified over 1 20 regulatory and statutory cost drivers that increased the
pnce of DOD purchased goods and services by 18 percent. The top ten cost drivers were:
- DOD quality program requirements (MIL-Q-9858A),
- Truth in Negotiations Act (PL. 87-653),
- cost/schedule control system.
- configuration management requirements
- contract-specific requirements.
- Defense Contract Audit Agency/Defense Contract Management Command interface,
- cost accounting standards,
- material management and accounting system.
- engineering drawings, and
- government property administration
6 Sweet at §33.04 pg. 735. Sweet cites numerous common conditions under which claims
against sureties become problematic and describes a variety of defenses which have been
successfully employed by sureties to bar claims.

and further delay in the execution of the project which significantly diminishes the
value of having the performance bond.
Another performance bond issue which creates cause to question their
value is their accessibility by small companies. These companies which are
frequently owned by minorities or women often encounter difficulties in obtaining
the bonds required to be eligible for federal construction contracts7 . This
effectively removes an entire segment of the market of construction firms from
consideration and reduces the competitive environment that the federal
procurement system is supposed to foster.
It is fairly clear that the existing system of requiring performance bonds
from all contractors is open to substantial improvement and cost savings. With
the Navy's FY 97 military construction budget of $525 million and the operation
and maintenance budget of $19.8 billion 8
,
a reduction of 0.5% in the cost of
construction contract could save tens of millions of dollars. It is possible that an
argument could be made for the simple elimination of the requirement, thus
achieving the savings of the bona premium without incurring any expenses from
new programs or policies. Unfortunately this approach wouid leave the Navy
7
General Accounting Office Report No.: GAO/RCED-95-173FS (06/26/95) Small Business:
Construction Firms' Access to Surety Bonds
. GAO found that: (1 ) 7.2 percent of the minority-
owned firms surveyed had obtained surety bonds before 1990; (2) the minority-owned firms
tended to be smaller, had less construction experience, and were more likely to have obtained
their first bond before 1990; (3) minority- and women-owned firms were routinely asked to
provide certain types of financial documentation and collateral to obtain a bond; (4) minority-
owned firms were more likely to have been denied surety bonds, and often lost opportunities to
bid because of the length of time it took to obtain a bond; (5) the minority and women-owned
firms that did not obtain surety bonds were usually not required to have bonds; and (6) the
minority and women-owned firms surveyed rarely bid on projects that required bonding.
3




exposed to default risk on every contract. Although terminations for default are
relatively rare, they can be very expensive when they do occur. Therefore, it is
recommended that an objective evaluation system be devised which can be used
to measure the risk exposure the Navy would face on any given contract and
impose the requirement for performance bonds only on those contracts where the
default risk is deemed to warrant the cost of the bond. The proposed parameters
of such a system are outlined in the following Operational Requirements and
Risk-Based Performance Bonding System Concept sections of this paper.
Operational Requirements
a. General Descnption: The proposed system for evaluating the requirement for
contractors to provide performance bonds on Navy construction contracts must
provide objective data on which a procurement official can assess the costs and
benefits of requiring a contractor to provide a performance bond. This
information should be based on an evaluation of the project requirements and
contractor data, such as. but not limited to. technical complexity, project size and
value, histoncai information on similar projects, contractor's expenence on similar




The system output must be an objective assessment of the default risk
to which the agency may be exposed in each contract-contractor combination
evaluated.
2. The evaluation process must be designed to be accomplished in the
pre-award phase of project procurement.

3. The system must employ principles and practices sufficiently simple
that an entry level procurement clerk can reasonably be expected to understand
and execute a basic evaluation with minimal training.
4. The system architecture must facilitate electronic transfer of
accumulated data at least within the Department of Defense network of
procurement agencies9 .
5. The system must not impose factors, beyond a contractor's control,
which adversely impact his abiiity to compete for Navy contracts. Full and open
competition must be maintained, in accordance with the Armed Services
Procurement Act. Diminished competitiveness as a result of a contractor's own
actions, such as a history of contract defaults, is expected and will be considered
as an intangible benefit to the Government.
Risk-Based Performance Bonding System Concept
The proposed system incorporates components of several concepts
currently being used in the public and pnvate sectors of the construction industry.
The intent is that the use of familiar concepts will facilitate the transition to the
use of risk-based determination of performance bonding requirements.
The major concepts already in use include:
Industry Rating of Contractor Performance: Within the Workmen's
Compensation Insurance Market, contractors are evaluated for their performance
in maintaining safe work sites and preventing compensable injuries from
occurring. This evaluation results in the assignment of an Experience
9
Establishment of the Federal Acquisition Network (FACNET), as mandated in the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 will provide means of distributing accumulated data.
8

Modification Rating (EMR), 10 which is public information and is used by the
contractor's insurance underwriter to determine the workmen's compensation
insurance premium to be charged in light of the claim risk faced by the insurer.
As a result of this system, a contractor with an excellent safety record will pay
substantially lower insurance premiums and achieve a commensurate competitive
advantage over other, less safe firms.
Risk-base Evaluation of Profit Objective: The Navy currently utilizes a risk-based
approach to determining objectives for contractors' profit allowances in negotiated
procurements. In this analysis, the Contracting Officer evaluates the project and
the contractor with respect to such factors as: project technical complexity,
management complexity, cost control complexity, the contract type, as well as the
contractors input of capital and the time value of money. This information is
entered in the form presented in Figure 1 and forms the basis for the
Government's negotiating position. Instructions contained within the Federal
Acquisition Regulations 11 provide "guidance" for evaluating each factor, however
the final value assigned is subject to the judgement of the procurement official
conducting the assessment.
The proposed system will produce an objective evaluation of the
Government's exposure to default risk by a process similar to that currently used
by the Navy for Weighted Guidelines Application determination of contractor profit
10
Donald S. Barne and Boyd C. Paulson, Professional Construction Management , pg. 220-221
(3rded 1992).
11
Federal Acquisition Regulations. Subpart 15.9 - Profit

objectives in negotiated procurements, descnbed above. The system will be nsk-




Technical Complexity of the Project: Without regard to the contractor
involved, projects which involve experimental technologies or construction of
highly complex systems may reasonably be considered as more difficult to
execute than more simple projects. Consequently, a contractor is more likely to
encounter difficulties which could lead to default.
2. Total Project Cost: Without regard to other factors, the consequences of a
contractor default on a very expensive project are more serious than those
resulting from a similar default on a less expensive project. Thus the
Government faces greater potential liabilities as the project cost increases.
3. Program Factor: This factor involves the potential for costs due to ripple
effect. The consequences of a default on a single, isolated project are likely to be
less severe than if the project is part of a larger development program. Thus
there is likely to be a greater cost nsk associated with projects which are part of a
larger program.
4. Public Relations Factor: The importance of public relations can not be
discounted even in the public sector. Projects with particularly high visibility are
subject to greater public scrutiny. Although the profitability of the 'firm" is not
technically an issue, the occurrence of an unbonded default on a high visibility
project may have significant secondary effects beyond the immediate financial
impact which might be of less significance otherwise. Not the least of these
10

secondary effects is an undermining of the public's confidence in the federal
procurement process.
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Contractor's Technical Experience: Projects which invoive experimental
technology or construction of highly complex systems may be inherently more
risky than more simple projects, however the involvement of a contractor with
abundant experience in the particular technologies included in the project may
serve to reduce the Government's risk. Likewise, a contractor not possessing
such experience may compound the problem.
2. Contractor's Performance History: A contractor with an established record of
contract defaults can reasonably be thought to represent a greater risk of future
defaults.
3. Contractor's Financial Stability: Virtually every construction project
experiences some difficulties at some point during it execution. These difficulties
typically impose some degree of financial hardship on the contractor involved.
The Government strives to minimize these impacts however, they can never be
completely eliminated. Therefore the contractor's ability to survive short term
cash flow problems is a significant factor in predicting the likelihood of default.
Furthermore, not all cash flow problems are imposed by external forces. Industry
practice includes a substantial propensity for contractors to "buy-into" contracts
by purposely submitting bids of less than the actual cost of the project in an effort
to stabilize their labor pool or in hopes of obtaining changed work on the project




4. Ratio of Contractor's Current Construction Volume to Bonding Capacity: This
factor provides insight into the contractor's current excess production capacity. A
contractor that is fully engaged in other projects may be more likely to encounter
difficulties in a new project due to insufficient availability of management and
production resources to devote to the new project. Furthermore, a contractor
who is operating at or near maximum production capacity may be less concerned
about the potential loss of a single project. Therefore, it can be argued that a
contractor with a high ratio of active construction volume to production capacity
may represent a high risk of default on a single new project.
The process flow involved in procurement of construction services under
the proposed system would not differ significantly from the current process flow





























Figure 2 - Current (As-ls) Procurement Process
The changes included in the proposed system occur in the controls
highlighted in Figure 2 in red. These changes involve the addition of the risk-
based bonding requirement analysis to the solicitation package and incorporation
13

of the resulting evaluation in the bid evaluation regulations. As noted earlier, the
current bonding regulations are firmly rooted in the legislation of the Miller Act,
thus Congressional action modifying the Miller Act is a necessary prerequisite to
any other recommended changes.
The need for legislative changes not withstanding, conceptually the
revised process of analysis would occur in three phases:
Phase 1 : Evaluation of Government Factors :
During the preparation of the project documentation, the Contracting
Officer will be required to conduct an assessment of the Government Factors.
This evaluation will be based solely on the nsks stemming from the project
without regard to the impact of Contractor Factors. The result of the Phase 1
Evaluation becomes public information and is included in the solicitation package.
Phase 2: Input of Contractor Factors :
Administration of the Contractor Factors portion of the system would be
accomplished by the bonding industry much as the management of Experience
Modification Ratings is accomplished by the Workmen s Compensation Insurance
industry. The revised bidding procedure will require prospective contractors to
provide their rating in the Contractor Factors for the type and size of the project
on which they are bidding. Since the Government Factors were provided with the
solicitation, prospective contractors will then be able to compute the final risk
assessment score and determine whether or not they will be required to provide a
performance bond. The scores needed for making this determination would also
14

be included in the solicitation instructions. With this knowledge, they can then
include the bond premium in their bid, or not, as is appropriate.
Phase 3: Bid Evaluation/Verification :
The proposed system will add a step to the Bid Evaluation/Verification
process by requiring the procurement clerk to venfy that the bids received from
responsive contractors include a properly executed Bonding Requirement
Evaluation before the selection of the successful bidder is completed.
As with any administrative system, the proposed method of risk-based
bonding requirement determinations may be subject to abuses or errors which
would result in damaged being incurred by the government, thus it is prudent to
conduct a preliminary assessment of the potential hazards.
Preliminary Hazards Assessment (PrHA)
The hazards posed by adoption of the proposed system can be separated into
two distinct categories: inherent system hazards; and hazards related to
organizations resistance to change. As is the case with any proposal for change
in a large, bureaucratic organization such as the U.S. Navy there is usually a
great deal of resistance to deviating from "the way its always been done.
"
Moreover, if changes are implemented, there is always pressure to revert to the
"old ways" at the first hint of difficulty with the "new way." Thus this Preliminary
Hazards Assessment serves two major functions:
1 . By conducting a thorough assessment of potential hazards inherent in
the proposed system prior to its implementation, adjustments can be made
15

which will serve to eliminate or mitigate those hazards prior to
implementation, thereby improving the potential for ultimate success.
2. Through the eariy identification of hazards, they become more familiar
and thus iess threatening. In the unfortunate event that predicted hazards
are encountered, there is less outrage generated and less resulting
pressure to revert to the old ways.
Additional objectives include:
* identification of potential hazards which might be faced under the
proposed system;
* development of various scenanos which would result in encountering
these hazards;
* analysis of the likelihood of these scenarios and assessment the
potential consequences;
* development of hazard mitigating strategies
Major Hazards
The classic Preliminary Hazards Assessment is geared towards an
examination of physical hazards existing within a system which may lead to
damage to personnel and/or equipment. Although it is certainly possible to
identify physical hazards which may be present on a construction project as a
result of actions occurring within the overall procurement process, there are no
dearly identifiable physical hazards specifically associated with the existence of a
performance bond, or lack thereof. The hazards which may be encountered as
a result of implementing the proposed changes to performance bonding
16

requirements are exclusively financial in nature. Due to the narrowly defined
scope of the proposal there are a very limited number of potential pitfalls. These
hazards stem from the contracting officers assessment of the likelihood of default
on a project. If this assessment is ultimately correct then there is no problem.
However, if the contracting officer s assessment is ultimately wrong then the
Government may encounter one of the hazards inherent in this system. Since the
result of the evaluation process is a decision by the contracting officer to require
one of two possible courses of action, required bond or not, there are two
corresponding major hazards. Each of these hazards are directly associated with
the contracting officer s incorrect assessment and are categorized as follows:
Category One: Unbonded Default
After conducting the assessment of the likelihood of default, the contracting
officer waives the performance bond requirement and the contractor
subsequently fails to execute the project to completion.
Category Two: Unnecessary Bond
After conducting the assessment of the likelihood of default, the contracting
officer requires provision of a performance bond and the contractor subsequently
executes the project to completion.
A cursory inspection of the above hazards might lead to the conclusion that
the consequences of Category One hazards significantly exceed those
associated with Category Two hazards. After all, an unbonded default exposes
the Government to the total cost of the project while purchasing an unnecessary
bond merely adds a 0.5% to 1 .0% premium to the project. A more detailed
17

analysis shows that the comparison is not that simple and that the total
consequences associated with each hazard do not differ so dramatically. This
conclusion will be examined in greater detail in the Hazard Consequences
section.
Accident Scenarios
The proposal calls for the implementation of an evaluation system which
employs eight factors to assess the likelihood of default on a project. Four of
these factors are used to characterize the potential contractor's contribution to the
probability of default and the other four are used to categorize the Government's
contribution to the probability of default. The proposed factors are:
Contractor Factors Government Factors
1
.
Technical Experience 1 . Project Complexity
2. Performance History 2. Total Project Cost
3. Financial Stability 3. Program Factor
4. Capacity Ratio 4. Public Relations Factor
Since each factor must be evaluated for every contractor/project combination
and an incorrect assessment of any single factor may cause one of the major
hazards to be encountered, the number of potential "accident'' scenarios is
exceptionally large. The desired outcome of the assessment is heavily
dependent on the accuracy of the information collected on each factor and the
validity of the model used to assess the factors. Thorough research of contract
archives will be necessary to develop the assessment model and guidelines for
system implementation. For the purpose of this Preliminary Hazard Assessment
the specific scenarios will not be considers since all possible scenarios lead to




As noted earlier, the hazards associated with the proposed changes to
performance bonding requirements are exclusively financial and fall into two
categories. The consequences of these hazard are evaluated as follows:
Category One: Unbonded Default
After conducting the assessment of the likelihood of default, the contracting
officer waives the performance bond requirement and the contractor
subsequently fails to execute the project to completion.
A cursory examination of this hazard appears to indicate a substantial
potential financial liability. The purpose of the performance bond is to provide the
Government with resources to complete a project for which the original contractor
has failed to successfully execute the project to completion. In the event of a
default, several factors come into play which diminish the value of the protection
provided by the bond. These factors include:
1. Partial Payment Policy 12 : In the execution of construction contracts, the
Federal Acquisition Regulations allow for the Government to provide partial
payment to contractors for completed work in place and for a percentage of
materials which have been delivered but not yet installed. Federal contract law
and applicable regulations governing these partial payments dictate that the
completed work and the delivered materials covered by a partial payment
become the property of the Government immediately upon the contractor's
12
Federal Acquisition Regulations. Subpart 32.9 - Prompt Payment
19

receipt of payment 13 . Federal contract law further prohibits contractors from filing
liens against Government property 14 . Thus as a project is executed and partial
payments are made, the value of the work remaining on the contract is
diminished. As a matter of policy, the Government representatives managing the
contracts seek to ensure that at any point in the life of the project, the remaining
project funds exceed the estimated cost to completion of the project. Thus is the
event that the contractor defaults, the Government should have sufficient project
funds remaining to support the completion of the project. This is never quite true
since there are administrative expenses occurred in the process of creating a
new contract for the remainder of the project and procurement of a new
contractor. Additionally, the new contractor's price will likely exceed the previous
contractor's price for the remaining work due to the reduced quantity and
complications associated with completing a project that someone else started.
However, the operative principle with respect to evaluating the consequences of
the unbonded default is that the Government is not truly exposed to the total
project cost, but rather the potential liability is limited to the additional
reprocurement costs and whatever premium may be required to procure the
partial construction. Thus existing policies already mitigate the value of the bond.
2. Contractor's Rights
15
: Under existing contract law, a contractor's right to
proceed with the project under contract is not necessarily terminated upon his
13
Sweet at §22. 02(G) pg. 464
" Sweet at §28.07(C) pg. 640
is
Sweet at §33.03 pg. 758
20

default. Frequently contractors experiencing financial difficulties which impair
their ability to proceed with work may request temporary relief from the
bankruptcy courts. In this event, the Government is prohibited from taking any
action to terminate the contractor's nghts to proceed without approval from the
court. Thus the presence of the bond does not provide the Government with any
relief to move the project forward.
3. Surety's Rights
16
: In the event that a bonded contractor defaults in the
execution of the project and the Government seeks relief from the bonding
company, the most frequent initial response from the surety is a dispute over its
obligations. Even if the surety does not dispute the obligation, relief is not
immediate since the Government must provide the bonding company with the
opportunity to mitigate its liability. This usually involves allowing the bonding
company to attempt to complete the project either with the current contractor or
by finding a new contractor. Only in the rarest of circumstances will the bonding
company simply allow the Government to proceed with reprocurement and
reimburse the additional costs incurred. Thus the existence of the bond may
provide some relief for excess expenses, but this relief comes with a large loss of
control over how the situation is resolved and the schedule for its resolution. On
time sensitive projects, which includes most projects, this loss of control may
result in a greater decrease of value to the customer from lack of timeliness of
delivery than is gained by the recovery of costs from the bonding company.
16 Sweet at §33.03 pg. 758
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Category Two: Unnecessary Bond
After conducting the assessment of the likelihood of default, the contracting
officer requires provision of a performance bond and the contractor subsequently
executes the project to completion.
The ultimate goal of the procurement system is the provision of optimum value
of quality construction services to customers for the costs incurred. Typically the
value of this service is measured in terms of cost, quality of construction, and
timeliness of delivery. Thus it appears that requiring an unnecessary bond on an
individual contract does not represent an significant hazard.
However, it is worthwhile to note that reduction of this hazard serves as the
primary motivation for the proposal. The consequences of individual occurrences
of this hazard are relatively minor since they are limited to the Government
incurring an unnecessary cost of the performance bond which is typically 0.5% to
1 .0% of the contract price. Thus each time this hazard is encountered the
Government pays a 0.5% premium for the services received under the associated
contract. Unfortunately, under the current system this hazard is encountered with
overwhelming frequency thus the premium is payment is routine and results in
significant excess costs and diminished value.
Conclusions on Hazard Assessment
As noted in the Accident Scenarios section, the comparison of the severity of
consequences of the major hazards is not as clear cut as it may appear at first
glance. On the basis of the factors discussed in the Hazards Consequences
section, above, the Unbonded Default does appear to present greater
22

consequences, but not decisively so. Never the less, based on the above
analysis, a ranking of severity of outcomes of the proposed system is shown in
the Hazard Matrix presented in Figure 3.
BONDED UNBONDED
DEFAULT 2 4
NO DEFAULT 3 1
Figure 3 - Hazard Matrix




Unbonded/No default: This option provides the greatest value to the
Government. Under this outcome, the contractor successfully completes the
project and the Government does not incur the cost of the unnecessary bond.
2. Bonded/Default: Despite the difficulties that may be experience in collecting
on the bond, this outcome indicates that the system has functioned properly. The
contracting officer s pre-award evaluation indicated a sufficient probability of
default that a bond was required and the contractor subsequently defaulted. The
Government's excess costs should be reimbursed by the surety and with
cooperation of all parties, the delays to the project will hopefully be minimized.
3. Bonded/No Default: This outcome is evaluated as only slightly less desirable
than outcome number two. In this outcome, the project is successfully completed
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by the contractor. However, the contracting officer s pre-award assessment of
the likelihood of default has been proven to be incorrect and the Government has
paid an unnecessary premium for the project in the cost of the bond.
4. Unbonded/ Default: This outcome also indicates a failure of the contracting
officer's pre-award assessment of the default probability and presents the
greatest potential liability for the Government. However, as discussed above, the
consequences are not as severe as the classic analysis indicates. Competent
monitoring of project progress and adherence to guidelines on the authorization
of progress payment should serve to mitigate the consequences of the unbonded
default.
The ultimate conclusion of this Preliminary Hazards Assessment is a
confirmation of the critical effect that development of the factor evaluation model
will have on the successful implementation of the proposed system. The
outcome of any project will depend heavily on the accuracy of the predictive
abilities of the default risk model. Furthermore, it points to the need to develop
reliable sources of information, particularly for the contractor factors. As the
classic cliche says, "Garbage in. garbage out." The predictive accuracy of the
model which is ultimately develop will only be as good as the information upon
which the model operates.
Conclusions
Introduction of a risk-base method of determining performance bonding
requirements does present an opportunity for real savings and the expanded
application of professional business and engineenng judgment by acquisition
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professionals working in the federal acquisition process. However, before these
benefits may be realized, additional legislative reform must clear the way for the
revised regulations necessary to implement such a system. Once such reform
has been achieved, the next step will be a comprehensive review of archived
contract data in order to develop the necessary predictive models on which
system operating guideline can be based.
While neither of these steps are likely to be accomplished quickly, it does
appear that the effort would be worthwhile and in keeping with the intent of the





TITLE 40 - PUBLIC BUILDINGS, PROPERTY, AND WORKS
CHAPTER 3 - PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND WORKS GENERALLY
§ 270a. Bonds of contractors of public buildings or works
(a) Type of bonds required
Before any contract, exceeding $25,000 in amount, for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United States is
awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to the United States the
following bonds, which shall become binding upon the award of the contract to
such person, who is hereinafter designated as "contractor":
(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer
awarding such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the
protection of the United States.
(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such officer for the
protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the
work provided for in said contract for the use of each such person. Whenever the
total amount payable by the terms of the contract shall be not more than
$1,000,000 the said payment bond shall be in a sum of one-half the total amount
payable by the terms of the contract. Whenever the total amount payable by the
terms of the contract shall be more than $1,000,000 and not more than
$5,000,000, the said payment bond shall be in a sum of 40 per centum of the total
amount payable by the terms of the contract. Whenever the total amount payable
by the terms of the contract shall be more than $5,000,000 the said payment
bond shall be in the sum of $2,500,000.
(b) Waiver of bonds for contracts performed in foreign countries
The contracting officer in respect of any contract is authonzed to waive the
requirement of a performance bond and payment bond for so much of the work
under such contract as is to be performed in a foreign country if he finds that it is
impracticable for the contractor to furnish such bonds.
(c) Authority to require additional bonds
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authonty of any contracting
officer to require a performance bond or other security in addition to those, or in
cases other than the cases specified in subsection (a) of this section.
(d) Coverage for taxes in performance bond
26

Every performance bond required under this section shall specifically provide
coverage for taxes imposed by the United States which are collected, deducted,
or withheld from wages paid by the contractor in carrying out the contract with
respect to which such bond is furnished. However, the United States shall give
the surety or sureties on such bond written notice, with respect to any such
unpaid taxes attributable to any period, within ninety days after the date when
such contractor files a return for such penod, except that no such notice shall be
given more than one hundred and eighty days from the date when a return for the
period was required to be filed under title 26. No suit on such bond for such taxes
shall be commenced by the United States unless notice is given as provided in
the preceding sentence, and no such suit shall be commenced after the
expiration of one year after the day on which such notice is given.
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